![]() ![]() ![]() Brasser, Müller, Dmitrienko, Kostiainen, Capkun, Sadeghi, 2017 Brasser F., Müller U., Dmitrienko A., Kostiainen K., Capkun S., Sadeghi A.-R., Software grand exposure: SGX cache attacks are practical, WOOT, 2017.Bernat, Miller, 2011 Bernat A.R., Miller B.P., Anywhere, any-time binary instrumentation, Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGPLAN-SIGSOFT workshop on program analysis for software tools, ACM, 2011, pp.Baumann, Peinado, Hunt, 2015 Baumann A., Peinado M., Hunt G., Shielding applications from an untrusted cloud with haven, ACM Trans Comput Syst (TOCS) 33 ( 3) ( 2015) 8.Bauman, Lin, 2016 Bauman E., Lin Z., A case for protecting computer games with SGX, Proceedings of the first workshop on system software for trusted execution, ACM, 2016, p.Anati, Gueron, Johnson, Scarlata, 2013 Anati I., Gueron S., Johnson S., Scarlata V., Innovative technology for cpu based attestation and sealing, In: Proceedings of the second international workshop on hardware and architectural support for security and privacy, Vol.In the evaluation, we show how VID attacks the cryptographic functions, and demonstrate the efficacy of SGX-LEGO in security perspective and performance. In SGX-LEGO design, we leverage the concept of code-reuse-programming to overcome the implementation challenges regarding SGX page management. SGX-LEGO uses the latter approach by permuting the memory access sequence at the instruction level. Previous defense approaches against controlled-channel attacks can be broadly categorized into two types: (i) disclosing the fault information and (ii) rendering the fault information useless. To protect enclave memory from such attack, we design and implement SGX-LEGO, an automated system that adopts execution polymorphism to the SGX enclave code. The goal of VID attack is identifying the detailed code information inside SGX enclave by analyzing the fine-grained SGX controlled-channel. In this paper, we introduce a new class of attack that stems from the reduced controlled-channel granularity, i.e., the Version IDentification attack (VID). ![]() recently demonstrated a controlled-channel attack technique which negates the prior assumption of page-granularity. Because of this, both the controlled-channel attack and the defenses of SGX are built under the assumption that an attacker observes the memory access attempts of the enclave code with page-granularity. Owing to SGX’s hardware features, the faulting address of the enclave memory is page-masked. One of the frequently discussed attacks against SGX is the side-channel attack by gathering page-fault information (controlled-channel attack). The introduction of Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) prompted security researchers to verify its effectiveness. ![]()
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